I'm going to post this, it's long but essential, this is an oral history of the Battle Of Midway, as told by Lieutenant George Gay, the lone survivor of the attack on the Japanese fleet by those brave fliers of Torpedo Squadron 8. Will require more than one post.
Battle of Midway
Oral History
Lieutenant Gay describes what he considers the United States' errors in the Battle of Midway. He argues strongly for the arming of torpedo bombers. Admitting he was very lucky, he gives the details of his famous rescue. He recounts his more recent activities which included skip bombing and aerial mine laying in the Solomons. Lieutenant Gay was born 8 March 1917, at Waco, Texas. He was appointed Air Cadet 3 April 1941, trained at Jacksonville, Florida, and commissioned an Ensign 22 September 1941. He received the Navy Cross for his heroism in the Battle of Midway and also wears the Presidential Unit Citation given Torpedo Squadron 8. He is now stationed at the Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida.
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Narrative by: |
Lieutenant George Gay,
Torpedo Squadron 8,
Midway, Solomons, Munda. |
Lt. Porter:
This is Lieutenant Porter. We are about to obtain a narrative from Lieutenant George Gay, who, as Ensign Gay, was the sole survivor of Torpedo 8 at the Battle of Midway. We are in Room 1827 Main Navy Building, October 12, 1943. Mr. Gay, do you mind telling us a few of your early war experiences before the Battle of Midway?
Lt. Gay:
Well, as you know Torpedo 8 was organized in Norfolk and I think you know the history of the Hornet and where we went and what we did. I won't go into that but I will say a little bit about Torpedo 8 and the things that they did before the Battle of Midway and before we lost the half of it that was in that battle, stationed aboard ship.
One thing we'd like to clear up right to begin with, Lt. Larson and his half of Torpedo 8 stayed in Norfolk when we left there in order to get TBF's and get the bugs out of them and get them fixed up for combat and they were to bring them out and join us aboard ship. However, it happened that we were in the Battle of Midway, he came out on the Saratoga and they requested six planes from him to go to the Island of Midway and they participated in the battle that day, however, the bulk of the TBF's attached to Torpedo 8 at that time were in Honolulu and missed the Battle of Midway. They later went to Guadalcanal and I came home on sick leave.
I might just as well start down. Well, Torpedo 8 had a difficult problem, we had old planes and we were new in the organization. We had a dual job of not only training a squadron of boot Ensigns, of which I was one of course, we also had to fight the war at the same time, and when we finally got up to the Battle of Midway it was the first time I had ever carried a torpedo on an aircraft and was the first time I had ever had taken a torpedo off of a ship, had never even seen it done. None of the other Ensigns in the squadron had either.
Quite a few of us were a little bit skeptical and leery but we'd seen Doolittle and his boys when they hadn't even seen a carrier before and they took the B-25s off, we figured by golly if they could do it, well we could too. It turned out the TBD could pick up the weight, so it was easy. We learned everything that we knew about Japanese tactics and our own tactics from Commander Waldron and Lt. Moore and Lieutenant Owens as they gave it to us on the blackboards and in talks and lectures. We had school everyday and although we didn't like it at the time, it turned out that was the only way in the world we could learn the things we had to know, and we exercised on the flight deck, did all kinds of things that we'd have to do artificially because we couldn't do our flying most of the time.
In the Coral Sea Battle we tried to get there and missed out on most of it but we were able along about that time to get in some bombing practice and to do some submarine patrol. However, the squadron didn't get to fly near as much as we should have. In the actual battle -- do you want me to say anything about the actual Battle at Midway and what we had there?
As I said, we had had no previous combat flying. We'd never been against the enemy, our only scrap with them had been in taking Doolittle to as close to Tokyo as we went, and in trying to get into the Coral Sea Battle; but when we finally got into the air on the morning of June the 4th, we had our tactics down cold and we knew organization and what we should do. We could almost look at the back of Comdr. Waldron's head and know what he was thinking, because he had told us so many times over and over just what we should do under all conditions.
I didn't get much sleep the night of June the 3rd, the stories of the battle were coming in, midnight torpedo attack by the PBY's and all kinds of things, and we were a little bit nervous, kind of, like before a football game. We knew that the Japs were trying to come in and take something away from us and we also knew that we were at a disadvantage because we had old aircraft and could not climb the altitude with the dive bombers or fighters and we expected to be on our own. We didn't expect to run into the trouble that we found of course, but we knew that if we had any trouble we'd probably have to fight our way out of it ourselves.
Before we left the ship, Lt. Comdr. Waldron told us that he thought the Japanese Task Forces would swing together when they found out that our Navy was there and that they would either make a retirement in just far enough so that they could again retrieve their planes that went in on the attack and he did not think that they'd go on into the Island of Midway as most of the Squadron commanders, and air group commanders, figured and he told us when he left not to worry about our navigation but to follow him as he knew where he was going. And it turned out just exactly that way. He went just as straight to the Jap Fleet as if he'd had a string tied to them and we though that morning, at least I did when I first saw the Japanese carriers, one of them that was afire and another ship that had a fire aboard and I though that there was a battle in progress and we were late.
I was a little bit impatient that we didn't get right on in there then and when it finally turned out that we got close enough in that we could make a contact report and describe what we could see the Zeros jumped on us and it was too late. They turned out against us in full strength and I figured that there was about 35 of them, I understand, that is I found out later that they operated Fighter Squadrons in numbers of about 32 and I guess it was one of those 32-plane squadrons that got us. Its been a very general opinion that the anti-aircraft fire shot our boys down and that's not true. I don't think that any of our planes were damaged, even touched by anti-aircraft fire, the fighters, the Zeros, shot down everyone of them, and by the time we got in to where the anti-aircraft fire began to get hot, the fighters all left us and I was the only one close enough to get any real hot anti-aircraft fire, and I don't think it even touched me and I went right through it, right over the ship.
I think we made a couple of grave mistakes. In the first place, if we'd only had one fighter with us I think our troubles would have been very much less. We picked upon the way in a cruiser plane, a Japanese scout from one of their cruisers, and it fell in behind us and tracked us and I know gave away our position and course, and speed. We changed after he left but then I know that they knew we were coming. If we'd had one fighter to go back and knock that guy down, catch him before he could have gotten that report off, I believe the Japs might have been fooled some, quite sometime longer on the fact that our fleet was there. I think that might have been one of their first contacts warning them that we had a fleet in the vicinity and that got us into trouble, I'm sure.
Also, we went in to a scouting line out there when we were still trying to find them and didn't and the skipper put us in a long scouting line which I thought was a mistake at the time. I didn't ever question Comdr. Waldron, of course, he had his reason for it and I know that he expected to find them but he wanted to be sure that we did and that is the reason that we were well trained, and when he gave the join-up signal we joined up immediately. I was only afraid that in the scouting line in those old planes we would be caught by Zeros spread out and it would be much worse. As it turned out, it didn't make a whole lot of difference anyway, but we joined up quickly and we got organized to make our attack, the Zeros got after us.
I remember the first one that came down got one of the airplanes that was over to the left. Comdr. Waldron on his air phone asked Dobbs and came out over the air if that was a Zero or if it was one of our planes and I didn't know whether Dobbs answered him or not, but I came out on the air and told him that it was a TBD. He also called Stanholpe Ring from "John E. One, answer" and we received no answer from the air groups. I don't know whether they even heard us or not, but I've always had a feeling that they did hear us and that was one of the things that caused them to turn north as I think the squadron deserves quite a bit of credit for the work that they did.
Personally, I was just lucky. I've never understood why I was the only one that came back, but it turned out that way, and I want to be sure that the men that didn't come back get the credit for the work that they did. They followed Comdr. Waldron without batting an eye and I don't feel like a lot of people have felt that we made mistakes and that Comdr. Waldron got us into trouble. I don't feel that way at all. I know that if I had it all to do over again, even knowing that the odds were going to be like they were, knowing him like I did know him, I'd follow him again through exactly the same thing because I trusted him very well. We did things that he wanted us to do not because he was our boss, but because we felt that if we did the things he wanted us to do then it was the right thing to do.
The Zeros that day just caught us off balance. We were at a disadvantage all the way around.
Lt. Porter:
All right. Don't you think those Zeros would have been up there even if they hadn't run into that cruiser plane?
Lt. Gay:
I do, yes, but in our particular case I think they would have been at that altitude after the dive bombers, which I think also was one thing Torpedo 8 and the other Torpedo Squadrons should be credited for, I mean given credit for doing. They sucked those fighters down so that when the dive bombers did get there, as I was in the water, I watched them and if they didn't like to dive they were able to pull out and circle around a little bit and come on down later and if they felt like kind of individual bombing practice it was, it turned out to be beautiful bombing, because the fighters were not--I don't say that there weren't any fighters up there to get after them, there weren't nearly as many as there would have been if they hadn't come down to get us. So I think that is one thing that helped save the day as far as the battle was concerned. It was pretty rugged on the Torpedo Squadrons, there were two other ones out there that day, Three and Six, and they were shot up, one of them almost a bad as Torpedo 8, only they just didn't get the publicity, but they do deserve the credit.
Lt. Porter:
Year, well, it's in the O.N.I. report. Of course wasn't one of the very bad breaks, the fact that the dive bombers didn't get there about the same time you did?
Lt. Gay:
Well, yes, of course. If it could have been a co-ordinated attack the fact that the fighters wouldn't have come down against us in strength, of course, there would have been just that many more airplanes around for them to take care of and they couldn't have concentrated on us as well as they did. Naturally, a concentrated, I mean an organized raid, if we'd been able to all get there and co-ordinate the thing we'd have come out a whole lot better. Definitely that's a fact that we, well, it's just known that co-ordinated attacks, torpedo planes always come out better if you've got that much help. It's the same way with anti-aircraft fire. The more planes you have to shoot at the better chance each one has.
Lt. Porter:
Do you think that the attack would have been any more successful if they planes had been more or less spread out. Wasn't Torpedo 8 rather close together as they went into the attack?
Lt. Gay:
Well, that might be true had it been that we were being shot down by anti-aircraft fire, but being jumped, as we were, by a squadron of Zeros, our beliefs were, and I think they were very well founded, that our only protection would be to stick together and let each plane's gun try and help the other plane.
In other words, in a TBD, with as few guns as they've got, the idea was to let, to stay together as a formation and fight them off as a pack rather than to try and spread out. We could have spread out all right, but they could have spread out too, and it would have been just that much worse on us.
I never have understood why it's been the general opinion in designing torpedo planes that it is not an offensive weapon. They don't seem to feel like they ought to put guns in it, and I disagree with that very thoroughly, and I can give my reasons for that.
When the Zeros attacked us that day, I was able, with my one fixed gun, to hit one; I know because I saw the tracers going into him. Of course, it couldn't hurt him with one 30 caliber, but in fighting us since in the TBF's, I've seen them get in front of me and I've wanted in the worst way to be able to have something to shoot at them with, and I had nothing to shoot at them with. In other words, we go out and get in trouble and we have to just hope that there'll be fighters around to take care of us; whereas, if we had a way of fighting our way out, we not only would go out with a little more of an aggressive spirit, we'd get the job done a little better.
That day, I got a chance to shoot at other airplanes that just got in my way. It wouldn't have been that I would go out of my way to try and act as a fighter plane, it was just that the targets were there and they will be there every time a torpedo plane makes an attack, those targets will get in his way and he ought to have something to shoot at them with.
I had to fly right over destroyers that were shooting at me. If I had machine guns forward and plenty of them, I'd have been able to give them a little trouble. Then as I got in close enough to drop my torpedo, I could see everything on the port side shooting at me. If I had had some machine guns to shoot back them, I might not have been able to silence those guns, but I could have made the gunners a little nervous. As it was, they were just sitting there shooting at me and I wasn't shooting back at them. Then after I pulled up over the ship and did a flipper turn, I dove down right at the fantail of this big carriers where they were rearming and regassing the planes. Gas hoses were scattered all over the place out there, and I know they were full of gasoline. If I'd had forward guns, I could have set that ship afire right there myself.
I had no guns to shoot with except that one little pea shooter, the 30 caliber putt-putt and by the time I got there it jammed, it either jammed or was shot up. Then after I went out, I flew over another destroyer and every time there was a target and every time I had no guns to work on it. They seem to feel that they don't put the guns in the torpedo planes because we'll go off and fool around and get ourselves in trouble. I don't think they'll have that trouble with the pilots because I do think that they should have fire power forward and also aft to take care of themselves so that when the targets get in the way you can at least have the self satisfaction, if nothing else, of shooting at them. I really strongly recommend them forward. I find a lot of people who disagree with that, but that's my personal opinion on it.
I found out a couple of things about the Battle of Midway in talking to a few people that were aboard the ship other than some of the pilots that I've known. of course, I talked to the pilots that came into the hospital at Midway and I was very much worried and wondered why, when I was in the water there and there were so many ships around me that were dead in the water, either damaged or picking up personnel, I've wondered why they didn't come in for a clean up. I mean our forces, why they didn't and I found out that unfortunate events had taken place. The torpedo squadron hadn't come back to the Hornet, of course, the fighter pilots were unfortunate and ran out of gas before they got back and I think most of them landed in the water, and the dive bombers went to the Island of Midway, to land, so the ship was back there with no aircraft whatever, except their combat patrol of which there were just a few fighters, and they were worried sick and I know, I've talked to them about that afternoon, and I can imagine a ship sitting there with her air group gone and way overdue to return and nobody's come back yet. That's one of the reasons why the Task Force was leery about coming on into clean up and I think the Enterprise and the Yorktown probably had the same trouble and that's one way that the 60 ships that were there got away from us because we sure could have gotten some more of them. Any other questions?