Battle at the Little Bignorn

[Naphtali]

At Custer's last battle enlisted cavalry soldiers were armed with a rifle and revolver. With how much ammunition for each firearm did each soldier begin the battle?

[Butler Ford]

Not enough!

BF

[NSB]

They had enough. They were issued cartridges made with copper and many of them, if not all of them, had case head separation and had to use a knife to try to get the spent cartridge out of the Trapdoors they were using. Most of the Native Americans were using repeating rifles. In any event, that isn't why they lost the battle.

[Thumbcocker]

I have read that for a long time after the battle the natives would go back and get cartridges from the dead horses or around the field. The troopers did not run out of ammo.

[FISH4BUGS]

It is said that Custer left the Gatling Guns behind because they were too heavy to transport and they would slow him down. I wonder if he had a couple of those it might have made a difference in the outcome.

[Bent Ramrod]

Can't remember exactly what the Docent said at the Little Bighorn Battlefield, but it sticks in my mind that the soldiers had something like 24 rounds of pistol ammunition and 40 of rifle.

As set up, a Cavalry troop had plenty enough to carry with them, and had to have the mobility to fight a sharp skirmish, and then withdraw to resupply. They had enough ammo for that. The country around the Battlefield is full of dips and draws, and the ranging capabilities of the rifles were largely useless as the Indians could get up close and stay under cover while shooting.

The soldiers were allowed something like ten cartridges for practice, which was not a common occurrence. So most of the shots they had were ineffectual.

Most of the last messages Custer sent out were to the effect of "Bring the ammunition wagons here NOW!!"

[Kraschenbirn]

A trooper's normal field issue was 18 rounds for his revolver and 30 rounds for his carbine but, according to accounts of the period, it was normal for extra ammunition to be carried when an engagement was anticipated. Doubt if the Gatlings would've helped Custer and the five companies under his direct command but might've been of some value to Reno and Benteen...if they had an opportunity to deploy them...when they were pinned down at Reno's Hill.

I walked that entire battlefield last fall and don't see how Custer could've made much worse decisions (as a commander) than he did.

Bill

[OS OK]

Custers arrogance and desire to dominate and destroy caught up with him and his estimation of the enemy...besides that was a running fight from where it started a gatling gun would have been one of the first things left in place as the fight morphed around the hills.
Archeologist have done a TV show years back to show how they think it progressed based on cartridge cases and loaded ammo dropped in the fight. It looks like the indians riding up and down those draws kept popping up and causing them grief from every angle.
Old Custer got exactly what he prepared for this time.

[Der Gebirgsjager]

There have been so many histories and commentaries written about the Little Big Horn that there remains little left to say. Custer was long on ego and short on tactics, and like the Indians say, "Custer had it coming."

[NSB]

If Libby Custer hadn't spent the rest of her life trying to make a hero out of her dead husband, the truth about Custer would have come out long ago. He was a very poor leader, tactician, and fighter. He lead his men into a disaster to bolster his own esteem. He simply faced the consequences of his decisions and unfortunately took a lot of good men with him. With the truth out, he was no hero.

[KCSO]

The problem with the ammo wasn't the cartridge case it was how they were carried. The official box was a 20 round box and the troopers wanted more so a lot of them used home made belts with 40 or more rounds, but the belts caused verdigris to form on the cases and the corrosion was what caused them to stick. This led to the Mills and other canvas praire belts.

[Thumbcocker]

While Custer was never short on personal courage; his tactics sucked.

[ole 5 hole group]

http://smith-wessonforum.com/lounge/492933-custers-last-stand.html

[M-Tecs]

http://smith-wessonforum.com/lounge/492933-custers-last-stand.html

Nice link. Thanks

[9w1911]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comanche_(horse)

My relative Captain Myles Keogh (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myles_Keogh) and his horse.

[waksupi]

I seem to recall hearing Custer graduated at the bottom of his class from West Point.

[country gent]

One thing that may never be known is what Custer and his officers were seeeing and teir thoughts at that time. Hindsight is always 20/20. THe indians mass attak and other things at the moment greatly influenced decissions being made.

[GOPHER SLAYER]

The Crow scouts warned Custer not to go down and engage such a large number of the enemy but of course Custer didn't listen and the Crow scouts began to sing their death song. Custer really thought the Indians would flee. I Wish someone could have lived to tell what Custer's last words were.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

Gatlings of the period were of very limited use unless you had a fairly substantial target in the direction the gun was pointing. As to Custer encumbering himself with them, it would have meant his being somewhere else, which would have been an improvement. Even if they had made it to the battlefield, I think they would have stayed wherever they were when Custer first realised he was in trouble and turned away from the Indian village.

The extraction problem with the Springfield of the time was known and considered acceptable by the Army. An analysis of cartridge cases found on the battlefield show that only a small minority had the marks produced by trying to clear a jam. We can't know how many jammed Springfields were taken away by Indians who cleared the jam elsewhere. But it seems unlikely that this problem contributed significantly to the defeat or that the Indians had enough repeating rifles to do so.

It is an oversimplification to say Custer was an incompetent. His miserable academic and disciplinary record at West Point is a matter of record, and without the Civil War he might have failed to graduate, or been appointed to some obscure posting he was meant to retire from. It shouldn't have taken much West Point to know that you don't split your force unless you have reliable information on the enemy's strength and location. Instead he chose to ignore intelligence which was actually good.

But he had an extremely good Civil War record, and it doesn't seem to have been a matter of simply lucking into one situation after another, in which charging everything in sight is the right thing to do. Napoleon used to say that battles are lost and won in a quarter of an hour, but in a cavalry battle it can be a fraction of a minute. I believe Custer had what the French call coup d'oeuil - power of the eye, to seize on the opportunity offered by a momentary and complex situation. The trouble is that he wasn't so good at seeing when there wasn't any.

[RED BEAR]

i am by no means a military tactician but to attack a village the size of the one at the little big horn with 250 men 20/20 hindsight or not seems stupid to say the least.

[Wolfer]

I have read Sitting Bulls account of the Little Bighorn. As I recall he said there were around 4000 people in camp. I'm not sure how many were warriors. He said the Indians thought the camp was being attacked and were desperate to defend it.
I personally don't believe Custer thought the camp was that big in spite of what his scouts told him.

[M-Tecs]

I believe that was the first major battle where the Indians didn't break off after the initial engagement. Custer was not expecting them to stand and fight based on his previous engagements.

[GOPHER SLAYER]

Our son attended the military collage, The Citadel and went into the Marine Corps. He rose to the rank od Major before in left the corps. He attended many classes on strategy and tactics. I asked him if they had ever mentioned the 10 Rules of War that was written centuries ago by the Chinese tactician Sun Sou [I may not have spelled his name correctly, if that was his name] and if so, why do they keep screwing up? He said they taught the about rules but they keep thinking they can tweak it and improve on it.Their disasters on the battlefields over the last couple of centuries show how wrong they can be.

[Battis]

Tom Custer, George Custer's younger brother, had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor twice. Sibling rivalry might have been one of the driving forces behind George's impulsive actions and decisions - the need to "best" his brother.

I visited the battlefield last August. Great place to visit.

[shooter2]

The indians were much better armed than was expected, and was unknown until the battlefield burned and was investigated about 25 to 30 years ago. Don't quote me on this as my memory sucks.

One body was found not many years ago hidden under a tree stump by the river. I believe he was one of the water carriers fron the Reno Benteen field a mile or two away.

If you can find it, National Geographic Magazine had a dandy article on this. I was there shortly after the fire and one of the Park Service personnel told me how they planned to lay out the grids yard by yard. They went over it with metal detectors and were able to track individuals based on the empty cartridge cases. Much was learned including how badly they underestimated the number of Indians that were there.

All that said, Custer and the troops put up a good fight considering the odds.

[Thumbcocker]

ative witnesses said that Custer was wiped out in the time it takes a hungry man to eat his dinner. Benteen was criticized for not riding to Custer's aid and it was no secrete that he despised Custer; but digging in was the logical choice. Several medals of honor were awarded to water carriers and marksmen who covered them from exposed positions. The Trapdoors were able to hold their own at long range over open ground not so much when the enemy was close and firing quickly. A seldom mentioned factor is the arrows arching in from the gullys around the positions occupied by Custer's troops. Most of Reno's casualties were when he broke and ran from his position at the end of the village and his troops fled in disorder across the river. The Sioux rode next to them and shot them out of the saddle. Surviving warriors said it was like a buffalo hunt.

[flounderman]

Custer split his command and left Benteen and Reno in reserve. Custer needed a big victory and he was a glory hound. He wasn't anticipating that the village was all warriors and not the women and children, he was expecting, and the rest is history.

[Katya Mullethov]

Manifest destiny , just say no , let's roll , yes we can , make America great again !

https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PLvbGNjur_T3S9ncq_Rn0AUAUtlZ4QK3b_&v=xW GAdzn5_KU

[johnson1942]

when the men dismounted most of their ammunition stayed of their horses. the natives used goose wing whistles to scare the horses. they are like a dog whistle of to day. to test this i and a friend took a high quality dog whistle and blew it hard next to about a dozen horses. they went nuts and didnt stop going nuts. to them a dog whistle is really painful, much more than even to a dog. also they were not well trained and got seperated and then over run. the natives said one older soldier was very calm and sat down and with his rifle and killed a lot of natives before they got him. they had high respect for him. custer was one of the last to die. white bull fought him hand to hand with all the other natives watching. white bull had a hard time but finally killed him. to this day on any sioux rez the last name white bull hold very very high esteem. also on other plains tribe rez/s. the natives said the battle lasted about as long as it took a hungry man to eat a meal. many of custers men could hardly speak english and again were very ill trained. both custer and buffalo bill have desendents on the pine ridge rez. they didnt mind the native young ladies. one of my papients who passed at 99 years old and would be about 110 now told me the families that decended from custer and buffalo bill. here is a kicker, crazy horse was at least half white. the tribe called him albino until he grew up. he was raised as a native since a baby and felt 100 percent native. some even said he was all white. we will never know but for sure at least 1/2. custer found out civil war tatics didnt work in the west. the natives had repeaters but they had many other guns also. they all didnt have repeaters, many many muzzleloaders was still being used. their favorite gun was a good hand gun and they were good with them off a horse. be very very careful with a dog whistle around a horse. i dont want someone to get killed or some one else killed trying what i said out. take it from me, those horses went nuts.

[Battis]

I bought a book when I was at the battlefield titled WHERE CUSTER FELL - A NATIVE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE. Many Indian eyewitnesses claim that Custer died at the river, and not on the hill.

[Mica_Hiebert]

I grew up 12 miles from the battle field, the key here is that last week un June the temperature is in excess of 100 degrees on the prairy, the Indians camped on the little big horn river and cut the American troupes off from water for several days. They where half dead of dehydration before they where ever attacked. Most of the men used their last bullet to kill the man standing next to him as a mercy kill as an alternative to being scalped and beaten or hacked to death by the indians.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

The Army decided to stick with the trapdoor Springfield although the rimfire .44 Henry and 1866 Winchester were available, because it would be better suited for war against a European army - which in view of its long-range accuracy was probably true. It probably owed much to Napoleon III's Mexican adventure, and the fact that the French had adopted a long-range 11mm. rifle, the Chassepot, in 1867) and it had proved far superior to the Prussian rifle (Shame about the strategy!) in their war of 1870.

All the same, Army selection could be a funny business in those days. In Army triaonels of 1875 the box-magazine turnbolt Lee performed extremely well. 750 each of the Lee, Winchester-Hotchkiss and Chaffee-Reece were issued for trials to 149 companies, which found the Lee far superior to the other two, which both had tube magazines in the butt.What is more remarkable, though, is that they said they much preferred keeping the trapdoor Springfield. Anybody who believes that, of fighting soldiers nine years after the Little Bighorn, will very likely believe anything. So the Board decided to await further developments, which turned out to be the .30-40 Krag. It was, fortuitously, a good decision, like the British dilly-dallying so long about their improved .402 Martini (actually about as good as military black powder cartridges can be), and thereby avoided buying hundreds of thousands of them a couple of years before smokeless powder and small calibre came along.

James Paris Lee fired fifty unaimed shots in a minute in those trials, and while that would have been pretty useless with the variously reported amounts of ammunition carried by Custer's troopers, there was great value in the ability to dump and replace a magazine without immobilising the rifle for a second, just like a modern automatic. Too much is made of claims that the Springfield can keep up steady sustained fire at a greater rate than a lever-action. Not when you are lying as low as possible and loading from a cartridge belt, it can't.

The number of Indians in the field was underestimated by everybody, by Custer less than the Indian agency. A village, rather than a military camp, might well panic if taken by surprise. It seems likely that Custer thought most of the warriors were absent or sleeping, and he hoped to capture a large number of women and children. He stated in his book published just two years earlier, that it was desirable to use Indian families to deter them from fighting. It is hard to fault Reno's decision to break off his attack, but there is little doubt that Custer expected it to be pressed home, and the village to be taken by an attack from two sides. Had he survived, it would be very much in character to have blamed someone else for failure.

Most historians now agree that he was killed early in the engagement, and there are Indian accounts which suggest he may have shot himself. It is unlikely in the extreme that Crazy Horse was either part-white or an albino. He did have rather light hair in his youth, but that is far from impossible in a full-blooded Indian. White blood would have been big news to his full sister who was alive and well known to white people in the 1930s, and an albino would have had poor eyesight.

[richhodg66]

People are quick to criticize Custer and he made a lot of mistakes, but his experience in the Civil War was pretty good and as often as not, boldness and audacity was what won the day and that was how he thought.

I've often wondered why the Army stuck with the Trapdoor when an American company was exporting rolling blocks to other countries militaries. Seems it would have been a much better rifle.

I've been to the Little Bighorn a few times, I much preferred seeing it in the Wintertime when there aren't any tourists around. That is a lonely, desolate place in February.

I have also heard before that the average cavalry trooper on the frontier at the time wasn't very well trained and most had not shot their assigned weapons much. Seems the evidence shows that they never really did get together in any kind of cohesive defense once things went south on them, they might have made a better showing had they done so.

I realize that the situations were different but comparing this to the British fight at Rourke's Drift, where similarly capable rifles also against a numerically superior aboriginal force and a very different outcome. Maybe training and individual soldier discipline made a difference.

[GhostHawk]

Custer has been known to say that with 100 Calvary he could ride through the whole Sioux nation.
He was proven wrong. He was promoted fast in the Civil war, but I think he earned most of those over the bodies of his dead soldiers.
He did not lack for courage or willingness to charge the guns. But I think he was long on dash and short on tactics. In the end it cost him.

If Custer had not attacked, stayed with his baggage train, picked a good spot to defend he probably could have lasted until reinforcements could arrive. However it was not in his nature to do so. Also Mica HieObert has a good point about water. There is none on the defendable ridges. Only down in the creek bottoms where you have limited visibility.

Ken Burn's movie "The West" also talked about soldiers mercy killing each other.

The fact is the Indians should not have ever let us cross the Mississippi. Once they did their fate was sealed.



Splitting his command, changing the guns, including the gatlings, nothing would have changed the end result.
Custer had a date with destiny. The changes would only have affected how many Sioux would have died.

[Jeff Michel]

I "think" that it was more than just hubris. Custer like many people of that generation, held no small amount of contempt for the native peoples both as "humans" or as fighters. A lot has already been mentioned about his poor tactics but certainly not the least of which is under estimating your adversary. The same mind set exists today with people with national notoriety, the endless pursuit of a legacy at whatever the cost to the nation.

[waksupi]

i am by no means a military tactician but to attack a village the size of the one at the little big horn with 250 men 20/20 hindsight or not seems stupid to say the least.

The way the village laid, it wouldn't have been possible to see all of the camp. It was strung up and down the river in the cottonwoods for a considerable distance. He should have listened to his Crow scouts.

[waksupi]

when the men dismounted most of their ammunition stayed of their horses. the natives used goose wing whistles to scare the horses. they are like a dog whistle of to day. to test this i and a friend took a high quality dog whistle and blew it hard next to about a dozen horses. they went nuts and didnt stop going nuts. to them a dog whistle is really painful, much more than even to a dog. also they were not well trained and got seperated and then over run. the natives said one older soldier was very calm and sat down and with his rifle and killed a lot of natives before they got him. they had high respect for him. custer was one of the last to die. white bull fought him hand to hand with all the other natives watching. white bull had a hard time but finally killed him. to this day on any sioux rez the last name white bull hold very very high esteem. also on other plains tribe rez/s. the natives said the battle lasted about as long as it took a hungry man to eat a meal. many of custers men could hardly speak english and again were very ill trained. both custer and buffalo bill have desendents on the pine ridge rez. they didnt mind the native young ladies. one of my papients who passed at 99 years old and would be about 110 now told me the families that decended from custer and buffalo bill. here is a kicker, crazy horse was at least half white. the tribe called him albino until he grew up. he was raised as a native since a baby and felt 100 percent native. some even said he was all white. we will never know but for sure at least 1/2. custer found out civil war tatics didnt work in the west. the natives had repeaters but they had many other guns also. they all didnt have repeaters, many many muzzleloaders was still being used. their favorite gun was a good hand gun and they were good with them off a horse. be very very careful with a dog whistle around a horse. i dont want someone to get killed or some one else killed trying what i said out. take it from me, those horses went nuts.

Another thing some don't realize, there were a fair amount of whites fighting with the Indians. Some of them had buffalo rifles, and could set back in the distance and play a hand.

[trebor44]

I "think" that it was more than just hubris. Custer like many people of that generation, held no small amount of contempt for the native peoples both as "humans" or as fighters. A lot has already been mentioned about his poor tactics but certainly not the least of which is under estimating your adversary. The same mind set exists today with people with national notoriety, the endless pursuit of a legacy at whatever the cost to the nation.

Yep, as it is today!

Another perspective: "Custer Died for Your Sins;An Indian Manifesto" by Vine Deloria, Jr. Interesting reading and informative. George wanted to be President and the power brokers in DC were on his side, provided ....

[white eagle]

He just ran into a superior advisory
quite a bit different from killing women and children

[Thumbcocker]

Of course he could have waited for the rest of the army including the infantry like he was supposed to.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

I realize that the situations were different but comparing this to the British fight at Rourke's Drift, where similarly capable rifles also against a numerically superior aboriginal force and a very different outcome. Maybe training and individual soldier discipline made a difference.

It is a valid comparison, for a number of reasons. The troops at Rorke's Drift were well-trained professional soldiers with experience in the recent Kaffir War, and members of an army which had learned the hard way that tribal peoples could make highly proficient soldiers, either enemies or on their own side. There is an old army joke about the young Indian Army officers who commanded rearmed Japanese to control banditry in Vietnam, and followed the age-old pattern of saying "There are no white troops the equal of my.... " before they realised what they were about to say. The movie "Zulu" is unfair on the men of Rorke's Drift. I think they knew that well-supplied and with a small perimeter, they odds were on their coming safely through.

But it began on the day of the British Army's greatest imperial disaster at nearby Isandhlwana, with the loss of over 700 British regulars and a large number of native and colonial irregulars. The men and regimental officers were of exactly the same quality, and they had two light mountain guns and a rocket battery. Lord Chelmsford's first was splitting his force, but ten to one should have been all right if everything else had been done right. In fact he violated the standing orders he had given, or at least signed, that a fortified camp should always be made in Zululand. Instead of laagered wagons there was a widely distributed wagon park, with a perimeter the troops couldn't defend when the Zulus kept coming after heavy losses.

Colour-Sergeant Bourne, portrayed as an old soldier in the movie, was actually 24. He died a retired lieutenant-colonel at the age of 90, on VE Day, and here is a transcript of a radio talk he gave in 1936. Either there was, unfortunately, no audio recording or it has been lost:

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/defenders/tran.htm

In it he claims that nobody was killed, and few wounded by assegais, though I don't think he can be counting those who died in the burnt hospital. The two Zululand actions, and subsequent ones when British losses were negligible should remind us that in savage warfare, it doesn't take much to make things go drastically one way or the other.

[Reverend Al]

We visited the Little Big Horn battle site a few years ago when on holidays in the area and it was a very sobering thing to walk the area and see all of the markers where the soldiers and native warriors died in the battle. The information centre has a number of related artifacts and lots of information about the battle. It was well worth the time we spent visiting the site ...

[Rufus Krile]

It is a valid comparison, for a number of reasons. The troops at Rorke's Drift were well-trained professional soldiers with experience in the recent Kaffir War, and members of an army which had learned the hard way that tribal peoples could make highly proficient soldiers, either enemies or on their own side. There is an old army joke about the young Indian Army officers who commanded rearmed Japanese to control banditry in Vietnam, and followed the age-old pattern of saying "There are no white troops the equal of my.... " before they realised what they were about to say. The movie "Zulu" is unfair on the men of Rorke's Drift. I think they knew that well-supplied and with a small perimeter, they odds were on their coming safely through.

But it began on the day of the British Army's greatest imperial disaster at nearby Isandhlwana, with the loss of over 700 British regulars and a large number of native and colonial irregulars. The men and regimental officers were of exactly the same quality, and they had two light mountain guns and a rocket battery. Lord Chelmsford's first was splitting his force, but ten to one should have been all right if everything else had been done right. In fact he violated the standing orders he had given, or at least signed, that a fortified camp should always be made in Zululand. Instead of laagered wagons there was a widely distributed wagon park, with a perimeter the troops couldn't defend when the Zulus kept coming after heavy losses.

Colour-Sergeant Bourne, portrayed as an old soldier in the movie, was actually 24. He died a retired lieutenant-colonel at the age of 90, on VE Day, and here is a transcript of a radio talk he gave in 1936. Either there was, unfortunately, no audio recording or it has been lost:

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/defenders/tran.htm

In it he claims that nobody was killed, and few wounded by assegais, though I don't think he can be counting those who died in the burnt hospital. The two Zululand actions, and subsequent ones when British losses were negligible should remind us that in savage warfare, it doesn't take much to make things go drastically one way or the other.


The greatest British disaster that supersedes Isandhlwana was their withdrawal from Kabul in 1842. That one REALLY went south with losses in excess of 16000 over three days. Out of the entire force of troopers, families, hired help, and hangers-on a doctor on a wounded horse were the only ones to arrive in Jalalabad. They spent a number of years ransoming families so some did actually survive but it was very few.

[snowbound]

I don't have much to add here except a personal experience in regards to Custer's 7th Cavalry...

I served in 4-7 Cav in Germany. I carried the squadron colors on five or six squadron runs. I'm not kidding when I say the first time I saw the "Battle of Little Bighorn" battle streamer on the colors it sent chills down my spine. My father was a big history buff so the first chance I got I called him to tell him about it.

(before all the ex-mil jump all over me about 4-7 Cav being a unit in Korea, the squadron moved to Germany from 1988 to about 1992 or 1993 before moving back to Korea. 4-7 fought in Desert Storm with 3rd AD. Sadly, the squadron was deactivated last year).

[Der Gebirgsjager]

The 7th must have been in and out of Germany more than once, because when I was stationed at Ledward Barracks in Schweinfurt, 1961-64, a unit of about 150 of the 7th moved into one of the barracks, yellow horsehead shoulder patch and all. Specifically which squadron I don't remember. Their function was recon.

[TXGunNut]

A book I read recently said each cavalry soldier at Little Big Horn/Greasy Grass had 200 rounds for his carbine or rifle, 100 held in reserve in his saddlebags. I haven't seen a similar number for their Colt revolvers but some apparently kept their old C&B revolvers in their saddlebags as well. When the cavalryman lost his horse he lost his reserve ammo and backup weapons.
One theory about the Trapdoors' shortcoming was the copper cases would stick when the carbines and rifles got hot. Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse both knew that and took advantage of it. Custer's loss wasn't about the guns, it was sheer numbers. His force of less than 250 was attacked by as many as 2000 (maybe more) Indian warriors and many of Custer's command weren't shot at all; they were killed by war clubs, axes and lances. There were so many Indians attacking the last remaining soldiers that some Indians could not make their way thru the crowd to attack the soldiers.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

The greatest British disaster that supersedes Isandhlwana was their withdrawal from Kabul in 1842. That one REALLY went south with losses in excess of 16000 over three days. Out of the entire force of troopers, families, hired help, and hangers-on a doctor on a wounded horse were the only ones to arrive in Jalalabad. They spent a number of years ransoming families so some did actually survive but it was very few.

The retreat from Kabul was unquestionably a greater disaster, although I was referring to deaths clearly from enemy action in a single engagement. The great majority of the losses were Indian camp-followers and troops. A high proportion died of exposure, and about 2000 were rescued by the "army of retribution" when they came back to Kabul nine months later, where they were slaves, semi-slaves or beggars, but a lot more were probably held elsewhere. Probably more than is often claimed made their own way back to India. Some soldiers rejoined their regiments, but probably a lot more chose a career change over saying "Here's another fine mess you've gotten me into."

Probably the Italian and Spanish disasters more closely fit the Custer pattern of overconfidence. General Baratieri in Ethiopia listened to a subordinate who said Italy would prefer two or three thousand deaths to a dishonourable retreat, and got over 6000 and something quite a bit faster than retreat. He had actually refused to issue the new Carcano rifles because he had so much Vetteri ammunition to use up.

General Fernandez Silvestre in Spanish Morocco probably resisted restraint by his superiors because King Alfonso III told him they needed a victory. The Spanish plans were published in the Madrid newspapers because they didn't realise that the Rif leader, Abd el Krim, was a very well educated former colonial schoolmaster and civil servant, probably quite willing to get along with Spain until they became oppressive, and had a subscription to the papers. Silvestre (whom Spaniards would call Fernandez, Silvestre being his mother's name) advanced too far without establishing supply lines, depots and fortified fallback positions, and probably lost over 13,000 dead out of over 20,000. Unlike the other two he wasn't outnumbered. It is unlikely that there were as many as 3000 Rifs in the field. If they hadn't tried for the part of their territory held by France, they would surely still be the independent Republic of the Rif today. When Alfonso got the word he said "Chicken meat is cheap", and it is hard to distinguish cause from result there.

The Italian and Spanish troops were grossly deficient in training and morale, but the British and Indians in Kabul were exactly the same as won victories in face of great odds against the Sikh empire, with technology fully the equal of their own, and in the Mutiny of 1857 (for loyal Indians performed miracles there, just as the British did). General Elphinstone illustrates just the opposite of the Custer-Baratieri-Silvestre kind of command failure. He was elderly, prematurely aged, totally indecisive, and lingered in Kabul into the hard weather, trusting the local leaders because they told him he could. But although weak, he constantly overruled the wishes of competent subordinates who could have got much of the army out. At least the British, from disaster, were able to say, like the last words of General Braddock on the Monongahela, "We shall know better how to deal with them the next time."

[Ballistics in Scotland]

A book I read recently said each cavalry soldier at Little Big Horn/Greasy Grass had 200 rounds for his carbine or rifle, 100 held in reserve in his saddlebags. I haven't seen a similar number for their Colt revolvers but some apparently kept their old C&B revolvers in their saddlebags as well. When the cavalryman lost his horse he lost his reserve ammo and backup weapons.

Other accounts suggest that they carried 50 carbine rounds, with another fifty in their saddlebags and a further 50 per man in the mule train. That sounds more likely, as 100 rounds would be ten pounds weight per man. Many would have parted company with their horses and saddlebags, and they never saw the mule train again. 23 revolver rounds per man has also been mentioned.

[Nose Dive]

Hmmm Gee guys... all data on all engagements are fascinating! I do know, at the Rorke's Rift engagement, a detachment of Her Majesty's armed soldiers repelled a larger 'manned' force. I have read a bit about this and in my opinion, their leadership and astute use of their small arms, and MARKSMANSHIP of these small arms played a large role. Here too, the attacking forces possessed fewer 'firearms' and were, again, in my opinion, less trained in these small arms use. Yes, field position and battlefield positioning too played a huge role. But, Here, I attribute that to the detachment's officer corps. So, leadership, marksmanship, battlefield awareness let some brave men march away at the Rift. I also know, if Custer's subordinates had 200 or 300 rounds each at hand this could have helped them. Let's say each man had 200 rounds at hand. As noted above however, they had poor battlefield location against a mobile attacking force. And, Custer had already split his forces of which neither were in direct communication, and the defending unit's marksmanship and firearms control and handling, due to battlefield ammo unused, was, in my opinion, in question. Here, I attribute this to poor deployment and leadership.

If we consider..."SPRAY AND PRAY"...(give Custer some automatic weapons) I don't believe even then, with poor battlefield positioning, Custer could have exculpated himself and his troops. At the Rift, Her Majesty's troops were well trained per man, and trained in 'force' battle field tactics which was a FORCE MULTIPLIER of their numbers and the use of their small arms.
They organised and followed orders, shot 'one bullet to one enemy' and they prevailed. In one account, one surveyor mentioned they moved bodies of attackers that fell 5 feet from their mussels and the bodies stacked up some 6 feet high. Yet, they held their ranks and fired upon command. Disciplined soldiers. If one would have broken ranks and run, they all would have probably perished.

So my take here, Big Horn vs Rift...

1. Leadership
2. Use and control of small arms
3. Utilization of battle field accouterments
4. Battlefield deployment of forces
5. And last, but not LEAST... MARKSMANSIP

Nose Dive
Cheap, Fast, Good. Kindly pick two.

PS: Is this the reason MARINES spent twice as much time on the rifle range than any other US Mil outfit? ND

[waksupi]

Watch "Little Big Man". The scene in the movie lasted about as long as the actual battle supposedly lasted. Ammo would not have been a factor in that short of a battle.

[trebor44]

Do a google for 'big horn battle location' one of many hits is the following:
https://www.nps.gov/media/photo/gallery.htm?id=0348C65A-1DD8-B71B-0B9F0C1EB6D85428

Note the lack of cover in the historic photos. The fire several years ago helped to restore the 'battlefield' to approximate what it looked like for George and the troopers. Many of the 'battlefield sites' in the west were of a similar environment e.g. Big Hole, Whitebird, and many lessor known ones. Custer was arrogant and his 'last stand' was a result of that arrogance. His 'public image' was more important to him than his men. He was not the first and certainly not the last to have that mindset!

[Thumbcocker]

I think that there are significant differences between Bighorn and Drift. First of all the defenders at the Drift had significant advance notice that they were going to be attacked by a larger force. They did not waste the time they had. Ammunition was opened (screw drivers might have been a factor in the defeat at Isandawana), bags of corn meal and wagons were formed into breast works, and loopholes made in buildings. While the two Captains in command did a good job once the decision to stay put was made there was not any really superior tactics involved. Veteran troopers who were well disciplined and had no illusions about their fate if they were to try to retreat stood toe to toe and slugged it out. I'm also not sure how much marksmanship played a role at the drift. Much of the shooting was by volley fire into massed infantry. At least one account mentioned that the Martini barrels got so hot that the wood fore ends charred from the heat. Not saying that Thomas Adkins wasn't capable of good marksmanship just not sure how big a role it played at the Drift.


Having massed infantry attack an alerted better armed enemy in a prepared position is quite a bit different than cavalry or mounted infantry trying to attack a numerically superior force that was also alerted after Reno attacked the end of the village.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

It is Isandhlwana which bears comparison with the Little Bighorn, since although a static situation, it was caused by rather similar failings of command. In particular Lord Chelmsford split his force without knowing the whereabouts of a enemy, as mobile as cavalry, whom he greatly underestimated. Even the future President Kruger of the Transvaal, who didn't much like the British, advised him that he should always laager his wagons in Zululand - i.e. arrange them in a circle, chained together with trek chains. Almost certainly that alone would have saved the column.

There are some inaccuracies in the movie "Zulu". The two British lieutenants were getting on in years for that rank, and unlikely to rise far in the army. Lieutenant Bromhead's future was particularly dubious, because he was almost stone-deaf. It wouldn't be true that Lieutenant Chard was a dubious commander because he was only a Royal Engineer, as that involved full military training at least as far as that sort of battle went. Generals Kitchener and Gordon, among others, were engineers.

A BBC programme some years back suggested that they performed rather badly in the battle, and the real leader when it mattered was Commissary Dalton. This was heatedly disputed by many authorities on the battle, but it is true that Dalton's part was underrated. In the movie he is portrayed as a meek, almost wimpish storeman type, who nonetheless carries cartridges to the men under fire. In fact he had served from private to sergeant, starting in an infantry regiment, and had volunteered after a period of civilian life in Africa.

Here is Lieutenant Chard's report, which was circulated by his superiors as an example of how one should be written.


http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/vc/chard_account.htm

[Thumbcocker]

IIRC the Queen promoted both Lieutenants two grades in rank to Major and that is where they finished out their service.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

IIRC the Queen promoted both Lieutenants two grades in rank to Major and that is where they finished out their service.

Lord Chelmsford was made lieutenant-general and full general in later years, but none of them was placed in the situation to do the same thing over again.

[fatnhappy]

I seem to recall hearing Custer graduated at the bottom of his class from West Point.

And Patty O'Rorke graduated 1st in Custer's class. He was killed in battle as well. I didn't realize lead respected class standing.
Sadly the good Colonel missed Father Corby's absolution by a couple minutes.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/d/d5/Monument_to_140th_New_York_and_Patrick_O%27Rorke.j pg/1024px-Monument_to_140th_New_York_and_Patrick_O%27Rorke.j pg

[Col4570]

Ballistics in Scotland,I have just read your post of Chards account of the events at Rorkesdrift,thanks for that concise and exiting input.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

It is a sobering thought that Custer had expressed an interest in running for president. It seems a rule of life that political generals are conspicuously bad at one thing or another, if not both. If you look for exceptions you get Cromwell, Napoleon and Eisenhower, and that's about it.

[trebor44]

It is a sobering thought that Custer had expressed an interest in running for president. It seems a rule of life that political generals are conspicuously bad at one thing or another, if not both. If you look for exceptions you get Cromwell, Napoleon and Eisenhower, and that's about it.

Well said!

[ole 5 hole group]

It is a sobering thought that Custer had expressed an interest in running for president. It seems a rule of life that political generals are conspicuously bad at one thing or another, if not both. If you look for exceptions you get Cromwell, Napoleon and Eisenhower, and that's about it.


Well said!

What!! Eisenhower?? of all people. What the hell did that man ever do that was exceptional??

I'll tell you what he did that started our country down the wrong path - he appointed 5 members to the SCOTUS that was called the Warren court. He was a politician while in the military AKA a kissarse and he was just as bad as a POTUS.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

Well Cromwell and Napoleon if you prefer it, but Eisenhower seems far above the usual run of political generals. He seems to have seen that a war in southeast Asia was a bad idea. As for his military role, it was in a situation that called for a curious, rather new intermediate management level between government and field commanders, and that he did extremely well.

[ole 5 hole group]

Well Cromwell and Napoleon if you prefer it, but Eisenhower seems far above the usual run of political generals. He seems to have seen that a war in southeast Asia was a bad idea. As for his military role, it was in a situation that called for a curious, rather new intermediate management level between government and field commanders, and that he did extremely well.

I think the SE Asia thing was a mistake on his part. All the French needed and requested was air support, as they knew Ike wasn't about to put troops on the ground, as Stalin wasn't playing nice. We had the air power and "the bomb", so we were the big boy on the block. I think we could have made a difference through air power, so the French could have departed under better circumstances, if that was the way it was going to turn out. Hindsight is usually better but when you have the big hammer and don't use it until the other guy has the same hammer - well, you usually pay a price for your generosity. ;)

When someone finds themselves in a position that's a little more than they can handle - they really need to have excellent advisors that aren't "yes men" or people you feel indebted to - Ike just wasn't the man for the job IMO.

Look where in the hell we are today, we may very well have a SCOTUS that will make the Warren Court look conservative?:(

[Ballistics in Scotland]

I think the SE Asia thing was a mistake on his part. All the French needed and requested was air support, as they knew Ike wasn't about to put troops on the ground, as Stalin wasn't playing nice. We had the air power and "the bomb", so we were the big boy on the block. I think we could have made a difference through air power, so the French could have departed under better circumstances, if that was the way it was going to turn out.

Apparently much greater air power didn't make that kind of difference.

[jcwit]

Boy, did this go off topic!

[trebor44]

Just think how nice it would be if .................................................. .............!

I read this over 53 years ago and was able to confirm a lot of the details with the guys who were there: http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1926747.The_Centurions. It makes for some interesting reading.

[TXGunNut]

Do a google for 'big horn battle location' one of many hits is the following:
https://www.nps.gov/media/photo/gallery.htm?id=0348C65A-1DD8-B71B-0B9F0C1EB6D85428

Note the lack of cover in the historic photos. The fire several years ago helped to restore the 'battlefield' to approximate what it looked like for George and the troopers. Many of the 'battlefield sites' in the west were of a similar environment e.g. Big Hole, Whitebird, and many lessor known ones. Custer was arrogant and his 'last stand' was a result of that arrogance. His 'public image' was more important to him than his men. He was not the first and certainly not the last to have that mindset!



No need to Google it, have looked it over quite well at ground level on a couple of occasions. Rolling hills, ravines and riverbanks offered a bit of cover but it was used little by either side. Custer made a number of mistakes but in the end he was simply overwhelmed by a numerically superior force. Contrary to popular belief the Indians weren't (as a group) better armed than Custer's men, they were simply superior in numbers and quite likely in skill as well. Any advantage the cavalry may have had in training and weapons was offset by fatigue (they'd had very little sleep in three days), poor tactics and underestimation of enemy strength. In Custer's defense the size of the Indian camp was beyond anyone's expectation, in his situation he could have done a lot more things right and the results would have still been disastrous.
JMHO, of course.

[Rufus Krile]

Apparently much greater air power didn't make that kind of difference.


Properly used, it would have made a LOT of difference as shown in December 1972. Until that point it had been used incrementally and predictably, with certain targets off the strike lists and severe restrictions on the ROE. Visual bombing rules... if you can't see your radar unit, you aren't allowed to bomb it. Hard to do during monsoon. Bomb runs will be conducted from the SE to the NW to restrict size of the bomb box... B52s made daily runs from Guam trying to find rail yards, oil pipelines, warehouses, etc located south of Hanoi/Haiphong but often ended up having to overfly and not release. Once Nixon told the AF 'sic' em, by the third day they were bombing rubble. That was when the North Viets decided they really didn't care what shape the table in Paris was, they wanted to talk.

I wasn't at Rorke's Drift, Greasy Grass, or Kabul... but I did participate in the SE Asian war-games and was an active participant in '72 as a member of Army Security Agency. One of the things on our 'to do' list was to find a place for the burdened Buffs to unload their 35 tons of ordnance. For some reason, they didn't want to land them loaded and Laos was handy.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

No need to Google it, have looked it over quite well at ground level on a couple of occasions. Rolling hills, ravines and riverbanks offered a bit of cover but it was used little by either side. Custer made a number of mistakes but in the end he was simply overwhelmed by a numerically superior force. Contrary to popular belief the Indians weren't (as a group) better armed than Custer's men, they were simply superior in numbers and quite likely in skill as well. Any advantage the cavalry may have had in training and weapons was offset by fatigue (they'd had very little sleep in three days), poor tactics and underestimation of enemy strength. In Custer's defense the size of the Indian camp was beyond anyone's expectation, in his situation he could have done a lot more things right and the results would have still been disastrous.
JMHO, of course.

I believe the Indian Agency passed on information on how many Indians had left the reservation, but wildly underestimated, if they mentioned, how many had never been on it. Also as with all large massacres by primitive tribes, who don't sign up to any uniform code of military justice, Custer happened on a moment in time when a masterly job of motivation and tactics had been done. That is one of the fascinating things about military science. It takes a lot of background to make a modern president or great businessman, but from time to time a great general, like Joan of Arc or Jan Christiaan Smuts, appears from nowhere and outdoes the professionals. It sharpens them up, and improves the breed.

[perotter]

...... from time to time a great general, like Joan of Arc or Jan Christiaan Smuts, appears from nowhere and outdoes the professionals. It sharpens them up, and improves the breed.

One does tend to find that these generals appeared when there was some kind of change that has occurred. In the last few hundred years it has often been a change in technology that has caused it. Those who 'appeared from nowhere' adapt to it rapidly, while the old generals stick to the old ways that they were taught or had proven to work well before.

[Ballistics in Scotland]

Since this thread has got to the stage where people can grind all sorts of odd axes without interrupting too much, I can't resist posting these URLs for anybody who might be interested.

Mark Twain considered his now almost forgotten Joan of Arc the best and most pleasurable of his books - a conclusion frequently disputed by critics, but it seems he did a better than usual job of putting over historical fact. Joan is an exception to just about all you say. She was no instinctive Great Captain, and the predominant military technology of the time (the longbow, peasants who would practice for years when you weren't watching, and well-paid professional soldiers you could recruit from them and trust afterwards) was something the French never mastered as the English did. She was also a seventeen-year-old girl in a macho world, and would you trust General Patton if he had claimed to be guided by hearing voices? At times the French commanders were scared stiff of her, as she might commit some military folly. But what they saw in her, and valued, was inspirational leadership, which could motivate a people much more numerous than the enemy, and with all sorts of advantages, but who had been cowed by a few disastrous defeats.

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2874/2874-h/2874-h.htm

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2875/2875-h/2875-h.htm